Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
a Foreign Corporation, Ralph Pahnke and John
Does I through 25 : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph J. Palmer; Reid E. Lewis; Moyle & Draper; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees.
James E. Morton; Bugden, Collins & Morton; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Ralph Pahnke, No. 940488 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6139

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

•A10
D 0 C K E T N Q

*J4C4r*'€A^

ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., a
Foreign Corporation, RALPH
PAHNKE and JOHN DOES I through
25,
Defendants - Appellees.

Case No.: 940488-CA
Priority No.: 15

DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. and
RALPH PAHNKE,
Third-Party Plaintiffs Appellees
vs.
JAMES NORMAN ANDERSON,
individually, and JAMES NORMAN
ANDERSON, as Trustee of the Anna
Lee Anderson Trust,
Third Party Defendants Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Joseph J. Palmer #2505
Reid E. Lewis #1951
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
15 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0250

James E. Morton, #A3739
BUGDEN COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-1888

Attorneys for Defendants Appellees

Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant

AUG 111995

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ANNA LEE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., a
Foreign Corporation, RALPH
PAHNKE and JOHN DOES I through
25,
Defendants - Appellees.

Case No.: 940488-CA
Priority No.: 15

DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. and
RALPH PAHNKE,
Third-Party Plaintiffs Appellees
vs
JAMES NORMAN ANDERSON,
individually, and JAMES NORMAN
ANDERSON, as Trustee of the Anna
Lee Anderson Trust,
Third Party Defendants Appellees.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Joseph J. Palmer #2505
Reid E. Lewis #1951
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
15 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-0250

James E. Morton, #A3739
BUGDEN COLLINS & MORTON, L.C,
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-1888

Attorneys for Defendants Appellees

Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS

1

Creation of Norman Anderson Trust

1

Opening of Brokerage Account for Norman
Anderson Trust

2

Letter of Authorization

4

Account Activity

8

Plaintiff's Knowledge of the Loss
of Levi Stock

9

Arbitration Proceedings

10

ARGUMENT

11

I.
II.

ANNA LEE HAS STANDING TO BRING HER
CLAIMS.
ANNA LEE'S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME BARRED.
A.
Anna Lee Need Not Establish that the
Trustee Knowingly Breached the Trust
in Order to Maintain this Action
Against Defendants.
B.
Defendants Had Actual Knowledge that
the Trustee Was Exceeding His Authority
in Margining The Norman Anderson Trust
Funds.

15

C.

16

Anna Lee is Not Guilty of Laches.

III. DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATED WITH THE
TRUSTEE IN BREACHING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED
TO ANNA LEE AND, IN SO DOING, BREACHED
THEIR OWN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND
STANDARDS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE INDUSTRY.

i

11
14

14

18

I.
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
(a)

CASES

Page

Alioto v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1412
(N.D. Cal. 1984)
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., et al, 841
P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992)

13
12, 14

Appollinari v. Johnson, 305 N.W.2d 565, 567
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981)

14

Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co.f 155 F.Supp. 755,
761 (D.N.J. 1957)

13

Centerre Bank of Independence v. Bliss, 65 S.W. 2d 276
(Mo. App. 198)

17

Hoyle v. Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. App. 1986)

13

Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802
P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990)
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemmf 76 Utah 372, 290

18

P. 161 (1930)

12

Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942)

18

Struble v. New jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare
Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 337 (3rd Cir. 1984)

14

U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661 F.Supp. 281, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)

18

Velez v. Feinstein, 451 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.App.Div. 1982)

12

Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust v. Weinstein,
509 F.Supp. 1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
(b)

18

OTHER AUTHORITY

Restatement (Second) of Trusts §326

18

Restatement (Second) of Trusts §327

14, 15

ii

II.
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Plaintiff responds to Defendants' Statement of Facts with
the following additional facts under the general headings
utilized in Defendants' brief.
Creation of Norman Anderson Trust.
1.

Anna Lee Anderson ("Anna Lee") did not read the Norman

Anderson Trust Agreement subsequent to its execution by Norman
Anderson on November 20, 1978 and has no recollection of ever
having read the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement at any time.
(Rec. 1450)
2.

Anna Lee admits to having read a letter dated November

17, 1978 addressed to she and Norman Anderson from Ron Cutshall,
a local attorney.
3.

(Rec. 1449)

The Cutshall letter mentions nothing about the power of

the Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust to engage in margin
business.
4.

(Rec. 1449)

Notwithstanding her review of the Cutshall letter, Anna

Lee's lack of understanding of her deceased husband's estate plan
is self-evident.

For example, Anna Lee believed that her son,

Jim, was one of the beneficiaries of her deceased husband's
estate and would receive his share of the estate prior to her
husband's death.

(Rec. 1450) Anna Lee did not believe that the

Marital Trust and Family Trust were integrated into the Norman
Anderson Trust document.

(Rec. 1451) Anna Lee believed that she

and her son were the beneficiaries of the Marital Trust and that
she was the sole beneficiary of the Family Trust.
1

(Rec. 1452)

These assumptions were entirely inaccurate.
5.

James Anderson, Anna Lee's son, never discussed the

limitations on his authority as the Trustee of the Norman
Anderson Trust to margin the stock in the trust account.

(Rec.

1458)
Opening of Brokerage Account for Norman Anderson Trust.
6.

Ralph Pahnke knew that it was Dean Witter's

responsibility to procure a copy of the trust agreement when he
established an account on behalf of a trust.
7.

(Rec. 13 60)

Mr. Pahnke independently reviewed the Norman Anderson

Trust Agreement, inter alia, to verify the identity of the
trustee.
8.

(Rec. 1362)
Mr. Pahnke understood that if an account were

established on the part of a trust, Dean Witter policy required
Mr. Pahnke to forward the trust agreement to the San Francisco
Operations Center for review, even if the trustee had already
signed a margin agreement.
9.

(Rec. 1362)

Mr. Pahnke also understood that pursuant to Dean Witter

policy, margin transactions could not occur within a trust
account without approval from the Dean Witter Operations Center
in San Francisco, California.
10.

(Rec. 1361)

There was never an amendment to the Norman Anderson

Trust that would provide for margin borrowing.
11.

(Rec. 1368)

Mr. Pahnke understood that if he received a mandate

that an account could be opened on a "cash account only" basis,
he could not margin the securities in that account.
2

(Rec. 1364)

12.

Mr. Pahnke admits that he educated Jim Anderson,

Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust, regarding how he could
access cash against the securities in the account through
margining them without the necessity of selling the securities.
(Rec. 1366)
13.

Kathy Barnett, Dean Witter's operations supervisor

responsible for reviewing trust documents during the relevant
period, understood that her function was to review trust
agreements when they were forwarded to her by branch offices and
approve them.
14.

(Rec. 1383-84)

Ms. Barnett reviewed, within the Norman Anderson Trust

Agreement, the Trustee's Powers and Trustee's Designation, in
part, to determine whether or not the Trustee was authorized to
establish a margin account.
15.

(Rec. 1390)

Ms. Barnett, pursuant to Dean Witter policy and

industry standards, would only approve margin business if the
trust instrument specifically used the word "margin".

(Rec.

1386)
16.

Approval was never given to Mr. Pahnke to margin the

securities in the Norman Anderson Trust.
17.

(Rec. 1365)

Ms. Barnett testified that if the Norman Anderson Trust

had been approved for margin business, she would have located in
her records a wire which approved either the trust instrument
itself or an amendment to the trust, which would have been sent
to the branch office to approve margin trading.
was located.

(Rec. 1388)
3

No such document

18.

The Dean Witter Compliance Department requested an

independent review of the Norman Anderson Trust instrument in
August, 1979.
of that review.

Ms. Barnett is not aware of the purpose or scope
(Rec. 1395-96)

Letter of Authorization.
19.

Mr. Pahnke admits that the assets of the Norman

Anderson Trust were distributed pursuant to a Letter of
Authorization dated April 22, 1980.
20.

(Rec. 1369)

Notwithstanding Mr. Pahnke's contention that Mr.

Anderson "dictated" the Letter of Authorization distributing the
assets, he admits that the entirety of the text of the letter is
in his handwriting and is written on Dean Witter Reynold's
letterhead.
21.

(Rec. 1369)

Furthermore, Mr. Pahnke cannot explain why Mr. Anderson

did not simply write the Letter of Authorization himself as
opposed to having Mr. Pahnke transcribe it.
22.

(Rec. 1370)

Mr. Pahnke cannot explain why he did not have Jim

Anderson sign the Letter of Authorization in his capacity as
Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust.
23.

(Rec. 1373)

Mr. Pahnke admits that at the time he prepared the

Letter of Authorization, he believed that a portion of the assets
of the Norman Anderson Trust were being distributed to the
"Marital Trust".
24.

(Rec. 1374)

Mr. Pahnke also believed that Jim Anderson's personal

account was actually the "Family Trust", contrary to the express
terms of the Trust instrument.

(Rec. 1375)
4

25.

Mr. Pahnke never established accounts in the name of

either the Marital Trust or the Family Trust.
26.

(Rec. 1377)

Even though Mr. Pahnke understood that the

distributions from the Norman Anderson Trust were being
transferred into the "Marital Trust" and "Family Trust", he did
not take steps to procure a copy of the trust agreements for
these trusts, forward them to San Francisco to be reviewed for
margin approval, or verify that James Anderson was the Trustee
and had the authority to margin the securities in the accounts.
(Rec. 1375)

In fact, Mr. Pahnke did not even know if James

Anderson was the Trustee of the Marital Trust or the Family
Trust.
27.

(Rec. 1376)
In truth and fact, the assets of the Norman Anderson

Trust were actually transferred into the personal margin account
of the Trustee and an independent margin account.
28.

(Rec. 1372)

Ms. Barnett's involvement with respect to the transfer

of assets from one trust account to another would be to approve
each of the trusts.

If there was not a request to approve margin

trading in the transferee trust account, she would approve the
account for cash business only.
29.

(Rec. 1393)

Defendant Pahnke admits that he was aware of Dean

Witter policies governing the opening and handling of trust
accounts at the time the stock was distributed from the Norman
Anderson Trust account.
30.

(Rec. 1359)

Joan L. Lavell, one of Defendants' compliance experts,

acknowledges that during the relevant period, if a trustee wished
5

to engage in margin business, industry standards required a
separate review and affirmation that those types of transactions
were permitted within the trust.
31.

(Rec. 1398)

Ms. Lavell also recognized as an industry-wide practice

that if margin positions were being moved to another account that
the firm would want to ensure that the receiving account was
qualified for margin business.
32.

(Rec. 1400)

Ms. Lavell further recognized that if a customer were

to instruct his broker to transfer shares from one account to
another and alerted the broker to the fact that the accounts to
which shares were being transferred were trust accounts (as was
the case with Defendant Pahnke), industry standards would require
a review and approval process for those receiving accounts
similar to that associated with opening a new trust account.
(Rec. 1401-02)
33.

Ms. Lavell recognized that it was an industry practice

to establish an account on behalf of a trust in the name of the
trustee.

It would not include the name of the beneficiary.

(Rec. 1407)

Despite the fact that Defendant Pahnke "understood"

that the accounts to which the Norman Anderson Trust assets were
transferred were trust accounts, he established the accounts
under different names including the individual name of the
Trustee.
34.

(Rec. 1123)
Ms. Lavell also recognized the fact that the

brokerage industry does not maintain trust accounts in the names
of individuals.

(Rec. 1403-04)
6

35.

Also during the relevant period, industry standards

required that until the trust had gone through a review and
approval process, the account would only be permitted to do cash
business.

(Rec. 1398)

Despite approval for a "cash account

only" with respect to the Norman Anderson Trust assets, and the
failure to seek any review of the Marital or Family Trust
agreements, Defendants caused the assets in each of the trusts to
be improperly margined.
36.

(Rec. 1022, 1081, 1123)

Allan Rockier is another compliance expert engaged by

Defendants to offer his opinions in this matter.

Mr. Rockier

was also asked to opine relative to whether Dean Witter breached
industry standards by permitting margin borrowing from the Norman
Anderson Trust, Anna Lee Anderson Trust or James Anderson's
personal account.
37.

(Rec. 1411)

Mr. Rockier testified that any account that is on

margin that has not been approved for margin business would be
identified by a computer run.
38.

(Rec. 1420)

Mr. Rockier testified that every account in every

brokerage firm goes through a review and approval process.
1412)

(Rec.

He further testified that most firms utilize the same

approach to approving trust accounts for margin trading.
39.

Id.

Mr. Rockier testified that in every single firm of

which he is aware, in order to conduct margin business in a
fiduciary account, it is first necessary to obtain approval from
the legal department.
40.

(Rec. 1413-14)

Mr. Rockier further testified that when approval is
7

obtained for a legal or fiduciary account, approval has to come
from some kind of a legal entity such as a compliance or legal
department so as to ensure that the trustee has the power to
margin securities in the account.
41.

(Rec. 1422-23)

Mr.

Mr. Rockier further recognized that there are two

standards of review for margin accounts.

First, a non-fiduciary

account would be reviewed for suitability, to-wit: "Whether or
not you are a little old lady who shouldn't be on margin".

(Rec.

1421)
42.

If a statement is issued with an indication of

margin

account status on it, it would either indicate that the account
had some sort of approval or that the computer didn't pick up
that there was a mistake or error.
43.

(Rec. 1424)

Notwithstanding the restrictions on the Trustee's power

to conduct margin business, the letter authored by Defendant
Pahnke transferring the assets out of the Norman Anderson Trust
put the assets into two separate margin accounts.

(Rec. 1123)

Account Activity.
44.

Following the distribution of assets from the Norman

Anderson Trust to the personal account of the Trustee and an
independent margin account, the Trustee utilized the assets as
his own.

He represented the entirety of the assets as being

owned by him personally on his financial statements.
45.

(Rec. 1566)

With respect to having represented to lenders of Jim

Anderson that dividend income which actually belonged to the
trust was income for Mr. Anderson personally, Mr. Pahnke replied:
8

"If I did that, it was because Jim Anderson asked me to do it".
(Rec. 1379)
Plaintiff's Knowledge of the Loss of the Levi Stock.
46.

Jim Anderson never told Anna Lee that he was

appropriating money from trusts established for her benefit nor
did he discuss the concept of borrowing on margin with her.

In

fact, Anna Lee did not know what "margin" was and Jim had never
mentioned that word.
47.

(Rec. 1454)

Anna Lee believed that her son was affluent and able to

afford the lifestyle he enjoyed because of his independent
investments in stock, property and businesses he had developed
and worked with.
48.

(Rec. 1455)

Statements for the Norman Anderson Trust, the James N.

Anderson personal account and the Anna Lee Anderson Trust were
.sent to the Trustee, James N. Anderson, and not Anna Lee
Anderson.
49.

(Rec. 1489)
In explaining that all of the Levi Stock had been lost,

James Anderson explained to Anna Lee that the stock had been lost
due to a "market crash."
50.

(Rec. 1459)

Defendant Pahnke also attributed the losses in the

account to market conditions.
51.

(Rec. 1462)

James Anderson never told Anna Lee that he had

transferred stock out of the Norman Anderson Trust in violation
of the trust agreement.
52.

(Rec. 1459)

In explaining the loss of the Levi stock, James

Anderson gave Anna Lee no indication and/or reason to believe
9

that the losses were the fault of Dean Witter and/or himself.
(Rec. 1459)
53.

Plaintiff, Anna Lee Anderson, regularly spoke with

Defendant Pahnke about getting money from her Trust Account at
Dean Witter.
54.

(Rec. 1448)

Defendant's expert, Allan Rockier, recognizes that it

is inappropriate for a stock broker to deal directly with the
beneficiary of a trust.

(Rec. 1417-18) Mr. Rockier further

acknowledged that a party having knowledge of a violation of
industry standards or policy has a corresponding duty to
affirmatively act.

(Rec. 1415)

Defendant Pahnke did nothing to

alert Plaintiff to his many violations of policy and industry
standards.
Arbitration Proceedings.
55.

The arbitrators in the proceeding between the

Trustee of the Anna Lee Anderson Trust and Defendants herein
affirmatively indicated that the claim which is the subject of
this lawsuit needed to be brought by the beneficiary in a
separate law suit.
56.

(Rec. 1352)

At the arbitration hearing held in December, 1990,

after attempting to raise the claim presented in the present
action following its discovery several days earlier, the
arbitrator commented:
saying.

"Let me see if I understand what you are

That Mr. Anderson took a fall in distribution from the

Norman Anderson Trust and he was helped by that or helped in
doing that by Dean Witter and you are desiring Dean Witter t o —
10

why is that a claim other than by the beneficiary?
Trustee entitled to raise a claim like that? "
57.

Why is the

(Rec. 1564)

Improper margin business was not a claim involved in

the prior arbitration between the Trustee of the Anna Lee
Anderson Trust and Defendants herein, nor was Plaintiff a party
thereto.
58.

(Rec. 1425-43)
At the arbitration hearing held in December, 1990,

Defendants' counsel, Joe Palmer, stated with respect to the claim
presented in the present lawsuit:

"If he wants to assert that

claim at a later time, file the pleadings and then we'll go ahead
and we'll try that case...".
59.

(Rec. 1565)

The Anna Lee Anderson Trust had equity of approximately

$880,000.00 prior to the April 22, 1980 distribution of stock
from the Norman Anderson Trust account.

Consequently, the

arbitration proceeding involved assets independent of those
received from the Norman Anderson Trust.

(Rec. 1562 & 1570)

III.
ARGUMENT
I.

ANNA LEE HAS STANDING TO BRING HER CLAIMS.
This Court has already determined that Anna Lee has standing

to bring these claims. Nevertheless, Defendants continue to
contend that Anna Lee lacks standing.

Defendants argue that Anna

Lee's standing to bring suit is dependent upon evidence that open
hostility existed between she and the Trustee, James Anderson.
Defendants' argument misapprehends this Court's prior decision,
wherein this Court stated that ". . .it appears the beneficiary
has the right to bring an action against a third party when the
11

beneficiary's interests are hostile to those of the trustee."
Anderson, 841 P.2d at 745 (citing:

Salina Canyon Coal Co. v.

Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 P. 161 (1930) (emphasis added).

The

Court's holding requires only that the interests of the
beneficiary and the trustee are hostile, not that personal
hostility exist between the parties.1
In the present case, there can be no question that Anna
Lee's interests were hostile to those of the Trustee.

Indeed,

the Trustee's "interests" resulted in great financial benefit to
him, including new homes, vehicles, business dealings and real
property, at the expense of Anna Lee's entire inheritance.

The

Trustee's "interests" were the driving force that persuaded
Defendants to place the Norman Anderson Trust Funds, of which
Anna Lee was the sole beneficiary, into margin accounts against
which the Trustee was allowed to borrow heavily for his own
personal benefit.

The Trustee breached his fiduciary duty to the

beneficiary by utilizing the trust funds for his own personal
gain in direct contravention of the beneficiary's interests.
Dean Witter knowingly facilitated the Trustee's breach of trust
by transferring the trust funds into unauthorized margin
1

Defendants' reliance upon Velez v. Feinstein, 451
N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.App. Div. 1982) for the proposition that open
hostility must exist between the Trustee and the beneficiary is
misplaced. Velez allows a beneficiary to bring suit against a
third party upon "a showing of a demand on the trustees to bring
the suit, and of a refusal so unjustifiable as to constitute an
abuse of the trustee's discretion, or a showing that suit should
be brought and that because of the trustees' conflict of
interest, or some other reason, it is futile to make such a
demand." 451 N.Y.S.2d at 115. In the present case, the
trustee's conflict of interest is apparent.
12

accounts•

In so doing, Dean Witter committed a breach of trust

as well.
Defendants' activities, in promoting the interests of the
Trustee at the expense of Anna Lee's interests, were all
conducted without Anna Lee's knowledge, and most certainly
without her acceptance or approval. As a result of the
Defendants' conduct, the Norman Anderson Trust funds were lost,
and Anna Lee was left penniless.

The pleadings and the testimony

received are replete with facts and evidence which establish that
Anna Lee's interests were hostile to those of the Trustee.
Consequently, Anna Lee has standing, as the beneficiary of the
Norman Anderson Trust, to bring these claims.
As additional support for its holding that Anna Lee has
standing as a beneficiary to raise these claims against
Defendants, this Court recognized that "other jurisdictions allow
a beneficiary to sue third parties directly."

841 P.2d at

(citing: Alioto v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (where beneficiary has been damaged by trustee and
third party, beneficiary may bring action against third party
separately); Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp.
755, 761 (D.N.J. 1957) (where trustee transfers property in
breach of trust with assistance of third parties, third parties
are primarily liable to the beneficiary, rather than to the
trustee; the right of the beneficiary against the third party is
a direct right not derived through the trustee); Hoyle v.
Dickinson, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (trust
13

beneficiary may bring action for damages against third party for
breach of trust agreement; Appollinari v. Johnson, 305 N.W.2d
565, 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (beneficiary may sue third party
without joining trustee).

This Court further held that the

Trustee's failure to bring suit against Defendants provided Anna
Lee with an additional basis for standing to sue in this matter:
In the present situation, it is clear from the complaint the
beneficiary could prove facts showing she had standing to
bring suit against the third parties for the improper
distribution of stock. She could show, at the very least,
the trustee improperly 'neglected' to bring action against
the appellees when he waited over ten years after the
improper transfer and still did not bring suit.
Anna Lee Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, (Utah App. 1992)
(emphasis added) (citing: Struble v. New jersey Brewery
Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 337 (3rd Cir. 1984)
(where trustee may sue and wrongfully fails to do so, the
beneficiary may sue the party or parties the trustee failed to
sue).

Based upon this Court's prior ruling, and the abundance of

authority relied upon and cited therein, the trial court's
finding that Anna Lee lacks standing to bring this suit is in
error and should be reversed.
II.

ANNA LEE'S CLAIMS ARE NOT TIME BARRED.
A.

Anna Lee Need Not Establish that the Trustee Knowingly
Breached the Trust in Order to Maintain this Action
Against Defendants.

Notwithstanding Defendants' contention that Anna Lee's
claims are barred by the statute of limitations, Defendants
recognize that pursuant to Section 327 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, a beneficiary may bring suit even when the
14

Trustee is time-barred.

Defendants contend, however, that in

order for the exception under Section 327 of the Restatement to
apply, Anna Lee must establish that the Trustee knowingly
breached the trust.

This contention is simply wrong.

Section

327 of the Restatement allows a beneficiary to maintain an action
against a third person if. (1) the third person knowingly
participated in a breach of trust and (2) the beneficiary is not
guilty of laches.

See, Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §327.

This exception to the general rule prohibiting beneficiaries
from maintaining suit against third parties clearly does not
require the beneficiary to establish that the trustee knowingly
breached the trust, as asserted by Defendants.

Nevertheless, in

the present case the Trustee's "knowing" participation is
evidenced throughout the record.
B.

Defendants Had Actual Knowledge that the Trustee Was
Exceeding His Authority in Margining The Norman
Anderson Trust Funds.

Defendants' assertion that they had no knowledge of the
Trustee's breach of trust is incredible.

It is undisputed that

the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement was reviewed by at least
three separate levels of the Dean Witter bureaucracy.
z

Defendants have spent endless time and energy
establishing that the Trustee had full knowledge of the breach.
They now come full circle and proclaim that it is undisputed that
he did not know. See, Brief of Appellees, pp. 29-30.
Notwithstanding the Trustee's self-serving declaration that he
innocently violated the Trust agreement, Defendants' discovery of
notes of conversations had between the Trustee and professionals
he employed manifests a clear understanding of the distribution
scheme of the Norman Anderson Trust. Any subsequent disposition
of assets by the Trustee, contrary to that understanding, was
clearly "with knowledge".
15

Notwithstanding this admitted fact, Defendants continue to deny
any knowledge of the contents of the Trust or the limitations on
the Trustee's authority as prescribed therein.

Curiously,

however, subsequent to their review of the Norman Anderson Trust
agreement, Defendants approved the Trust funds for "cash"
business only.

(Rec. 1061 & 1066) Even more curious is the

undisputed fact that Defendants never approved the Norman
Anderson Trust funds for "margin" business.

(Rec. 1083-84)

Notwithstanding these crucial facts, it is undisputed that
Defendants transferred the trust funds into margin accounts,
where they were margined and ultimately lost as a result of
margin calls.

Defendants knew, based upon their review of the

Trust document, that the Norman Anderson Trust funds could not be
margined.

This fact is evidenced by Defendants' approval of the

Trust funds for cash business only, and the Trustor's failure to
amend the Trust to allow the Trustee to conduct margin business.
Possessed of this knowledge, Defendants improperly transferred
the funds into unauthorized margin accounts and allowed the
Trustee to access those funds for his own personal benefit until
the funds were entirely depleted.

The knowledge of Defendants is

obvious.
C.

Anna Lee is Not Guilty of Laches,

Anna Lee was informed in 1984 that she had sustained losses.
She was also told why.

A radical decline in the market had wiped

out the equity in her account.

She was never told that the

margining of her trust funds was improper or that compliance with
16

industry standards and Dean Witter policies would have prevented
the funds from being margined.

She was never informed that

violations of industry standards and Dean Witter policies had
facilitated the deposit of the funds into the wrong accounts.
She had no way of knowing any of this.
account statements.

She never received

She never saw the Letter of Authorization

handwritten by Defendant Pahnke and signed by her Trustee/son
which put the money in the wrong accounts. All material
information was concealed.
believable, explanation.

She was simply given a false, yet

Due to the nature of their

relationship, Defendants and the Trustee had an affirmative duty
to disclose these material facts to Plaintiff.

See, Centerre

Bank of Independence v. Bliss, 765 S.W. 2d 276 (Mo. App. 1988).
Anna Lee first learned that Defendants transferred the
Norman Anderson Trust funds into unauthorized margin accounts,
and thereafter allowed the Trustee to improperly access the
funds, in December 1990.

(Rec. 1136-37) Within days of learning

this information, Anna Lee filed the present suit.

There is

simply no evidence of delay on Anna Lee's part.
Finally, Defendants should not be permitted to claim
prejudice as a result of the passage of time between the events
giving rise to this suit and the time the suit was filed.

Any

prejudice Defendants may claim from the loss of documents and/or
the dimming of memories is the result of their own conduct in
failing to disclose their role in a breach of trust and
concealing Plaintiff's claims for over ten years.
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Consequently,

Defendants have failed to establish the requisite "lack of
diligence" on the part of Plaintiff as well as "injury" owing to
Plaintiff's lack of diligence as required by Utah law.

See,

Plateau Mining Co. v. State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990).
III. DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY PARTICIPATED WITH THE TRUSTEE IN
BREACHING FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO ANNA LEE AND, IN SO
DOING, BREACHED THEIR OWN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND
STANDARDS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE INDUSTRY.
Defendants' claim that they owed no duty to Anna Lee and
therefore cannot be held liable to her is entirely void of merit.
Defendants' claim ignores the well-established rule that a third
party who participates with a fiduciary in a breach of the
fiduciary's duty is liable to the beneficiary. See, Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, §326 (1976).

See also:

United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).

Seminole Nation v.

Defendants' claim that they

cannot be held liable to Anna Lee unless they personally
benefitted from the breach is equally void of merit.
Specifically, " . . . one who, even without breaching any duty
owed on his own behalf, aids a trustee in breaching the fiduciary
duty . . . may be held liable as a de facto trustee even if he
does not benefit from the breach."

Wisconsin Real Estate

Investment Trust v. Weinstein, 509 F.Supp. 1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis.
1981).

See also, U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661 F.Supp. 281, 294

(E.D.N.Y. 1987).

Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Defendants

received a significant benefit from their participation in the
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breach of trust.
Defendants' contention that they lacked ac
the breach of trust and violated no industry st

1 knowledge of
^ards in

carrying out the instructions of the Trustee is patently wrong.
Furthermore, Defendants' contention that the expert witnesses
agree that Defendants did nothing wrong and had no actual
knowledge of the breach of trust is a fundamental
mischaracterization.

As set forth below, both the lay and expert

testimony established that Defendants knowingly violated numerous
industry standards and guidelines in margining the Norman
Anderson Trust funds.
1.

Kathy Barnett.

Kathy Barnett, an operations supervisor for Dean Witter
during the relevant period, admits that she reviewed, within the
Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, the Trustee's Powers and
Trustee's Designation, in part, to determine whether or not the
Trustee was authorized to establish a margin account.

(Rec.

1390) Ms. Barnett acknowledged that she would only approve
margin business if the trust instrument specifically used the
word "margin".

(Rec. 1386)

Based upon her review of the Norman

Anderson Trust document, she approved the Trust for "cash"
business only.

Ms. Barnett testified that if the Norman Anderson

Trust had ever been approved for margin business, she would have
3

Defendants' contention that they did not benefit from the
breach of trust is disingenuous. Defendant Pahnke admitted that
he made more in commissions off of these margin accounts than off
of any other customer in his career, and Dean Witter made in
excess of one million dollars in margin interest. (Rec. 1125)
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located in her records a wire which approved either the trust
instrument itself or an amendment to the trust which would have
been sent to the branch office*

(Rec. 1388)

No such record was

ever located. Id.
Similarly, Ms. Barnett's responsibilities with respect to
assets transferred from one trust account to another would be to
review and approve each trust agreement.

If she had not been

asked to approve margin trading in the transferee trust account,
she would have approved the account for cash business only.
(Rec. 1393)
Defendant Pahnke has acknowledged that he was aware of Dean
Witter policies governing the opening and handling of trust
accounts at the time the stock was distributed from the Norman
Anderson Trust account.

(Rec. 1359)

In spite of his knowledge,

Mr. Pahnke breached each and every one of the foregoing policies,
procedures and industry standards, as described by Ms. Barnett.
Specifically, no one at the operations level of Dean Witter ever
gave approval to Mr. Pahnke to margin the securities in the
Norman Anderson Trust.

(Rec. 1365)

Yet, Defendants allowed

securities in the trust accounts to be margined.

No one at the

operations level of Dean Witter ever approved the transferee
accounts, where the Norman Anderson Trust funds were placed, for
margin business.

Notwithstanding that fact, Defendants margined

the securities after they were transferred into the two
unapproved transferee accounts.

Defendants' actions not only

assisted the Trustee in breaching his fiduciary duties to Anna
20

Lee, they constituted flagrant departures from Defendants' own
policies and procedures as well as industry standards.
2.

Joan L. Laveil.

Joan L. Lavell, one of Defendants' compliance experts,
acknowledges that during the relevant period, if trust accounts
wished to engage in margin business, it was first necessary to
separately review and affirm that those types of transactions
were permitted within the trust.

(Rec. 1398) Ms. Lavell also

recognized as an industry-wide practice that if margin positions
were being moved to another account that the firm would want to
ensure that the receiving account was qualified for margin
business.

(Rec. 1400) Ms. Lavell further recognized that if a

customer were to instruct his broker to transfer shares from one
account to another and alerted the broker to the fact that the
accounts to which shares were being transferred were trust
accounts, industry standards would require a review and approval
process for those receiving accounts similar to that associated
with opening a new trust account.

(Rec. 1401-02)

In the present case, Defendants breached every one of the
foregoing industry standards.

Defendants failed to review the

Marital and Family Trusts to determine the identity of the
trustee(s) and whether the trusts provided and/or allowed for
margin business.

Under industry standards and Dean Witter's own

policies, they did not.

Similarly, when the Norman Anderson

Trust funds were transferred into the Marital and Family Trust
accounts, Defendants failed to determine if those receiving
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accounts were authorized for margin activity.

They were not.

Consequently, industry standards required that the accounts be
permitted to conduct cash business only.

(Rec. 1398)

Although Defendants purported to transfer the Norman
Anderson Trust funds into the "Marital Trust" and the "Family
Trust" as required by the trust instrument, the funds were
actually transferred into the personal margin account of the
Trustee and a separate margin account.

The transferee accounts

were maintained under the names of "James N. Anderson" and the
"Anna Lee Anderson Trust".

Thus, the Marital and Family Trust

accounts were maintained under names other than the designated
trusts, thus allowing the Trustee and Defendants to circumvent
established policy and industry standards.

The accounts were

immediately allowed to conduct margin business, even though they
were never reviewed and/or approved for the same.

Had they been

reviewed, industry standards would have prevented their approval
for margin business, absent an amendment from the Trustor, Norman
Anderson.

Since Norman Anderson was dead, an amendment would

never have been possible.

All of these departures from industry

standards, which facilitated the breaches of trust, are directly
attributable to Defendants.
3. Allan Rockier.
Allan Rockier is another compliance expert engaged by
Defendants to offer his opinions in this matter.

Mr. Rockier

was also asked to opine relative to whether Dean Witter breached
industry standards by permitting margin borrowing from the Norman
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Anderson Trust, Anna Lee Anderson Trust or James Anderson's
personal account.

(Rec. 141"*

Mr. Rockier testified that every

account in every brokerage firm goes through a review and
approval process.

(Rec. 1412)

He further testified that most

firms have the same approach to approving trust accounts for
margin trading. (Rec. 1412) Mr. Rockier testified that in every
single firm of which he is aware, it was first necessary to
obtain approval from the legal department prior to margining a
fiduciary account.

(Rec. 1413-14) When approval is obtained for

a fiduciary account, approval has to come from some kind of a
legal entity such as a compliance or legal department so as to
ensure that the trustee has the power to margin the securities in
the account.

(Rec. 1422-23)

In the present case, Defendants obtained no such approval
and made no attempt to ensure that the Trustee had the power to
margin the securities in the Norman Anderson Trust account, and
correspondingly, in the Marital and Family Trust accounts.
Defendants knew that fiduciary accounts were involved and that
margin activity was being conducted in those accounts without
approval.

Of the three trusts in question, one was approved for

"cash" business only (the Norman Anderson Trust) and the other
two (Marital and Family Trusts) were not even submitted for
review.

Indeed, Defendants did not even bother to determine the

identity of the trustee of the Marital and/or Family Trusts.
Defendants' conduct as described herein constitutes a flagrant
breach of industry standards and Defendants' own policies and
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procedures•
Finally, the collusion between Defendants and the Trustee is
apparent.

Defendants knew that the Trustee was benefitting

personally from the breach of trust.

Defendants assisted the

Trustee in his purchase of a $500,000 home and a Mercedes
automobile with funds obtained by borrowing on margin against
Anna Lee's trust funds. Defendants also reported to other
financial institutions and entities that Anna Lee's trust funds
were the personal funds of the Trustee.

Defendants knew exactly

what the Trustee was doing and enabled him to do it.

The

breaches of trust in question, and the losses that resulted to
the beneficiary, took place under Defendants' watchful eye and
with their knowing assistance.
CONCLUSION
Triable issues of fact exist with regard to Plaintiff's
standing, whether her claims are time barred and whether
Defendants had actual knowledge of the breach of trust.
Consequently, the trial court's summary judgment should be
reversed, and this matter should be remanded for further
^ Defendants' comparison of the facts in the present case
to a hypothetical sale of the stock and subsequent
misappropriation by the Trustee is misguided. There would have
been nothing improper about the Trustee selling the stock and
moving the cash received from the sale to another brokerage house
or placing the funds in a bank account. Moreover, if the Trustee
had sold the stock, removed the cash from Dean Witter and
thereafter converted the funds, Defendants would have had no
participation in or knowledge of the breach of trust and thus no
culpability. The present case, however, is entirely
distinguishable. Defendants were not only aware that the Trustee
margined and eventually appropriated the Trust funds, they
enabled him to do so.
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